Social Media Won't Free Us
All of these events captured the attention and imagination of Westerners, not because of the prospect of democracy arising in those countries, but because of the presumed role played by Western-made technologies -namely, social media platforms.
According to journalists, Iran experienced a "Twitter revolution," while Egypt's was a "Facebook revolution." We were told that social media was crucial for dissenters to organize themselves, plan their actions, and publicize their agendas both in their own countries and abroad. The hype reached such a point that Twitter was asked to delay a scheduled outage to allow the protest in Iran go on undisturbed, and some officials even suggested that its founders deserved the Nobel Peace Prize.
Those glossy portrayals unfortunately were wrong: the Arab Spring was as much a social media revolution as the Mexican Revolution was a Leica (a brand of camera) revolution. 1 Certainly, social media played a role but only for a minority of protesters and, to be honest, it turned out quite badly for some of them -at least in Iran.
Power and Paranoia
The truth is that during the protests in Iran, only about 20,000 people (from a population of 70 million) were using Twitter, and they were far from being representative of Iranians as a whole, nor even of the opposition forces. Similar arguments can be applied to Egypt, where social media activists that Western media labeled spokespersons have been accused of not only being detached from most protesters but even from the uprising's real action and violence. 2 On top of that, for an authoritarian regime being confronted by some of its people, it doesn't matter whether social media plays a role. It's enough for relevant state actors to claim or assert that use of such technology leads to security risks, so that any user might be viewed as a potential dissenter -or even a spy.
Indeed, the viewpoint from Western media and governments about Twitter usage in Iran backfired on Iranian Twitter users. To start with, access to the service was blocked by local ISPs; moreover, all of the information about those dissenters was readily available for authorities to collect -pictures, videos, texts, and connections to other activists on the same social networking site. What's more, regime sympathizers were not only using social media to spread proregime information to demobilize dissenters, but also crowdsourcing the identification of protesters appearing in the collected pictures.
Actually, claiming that social media is able to overthrow authoritarian regimes only makes those regimes more authoritarian and paranoid. For instance, in Egypt, which experienced the uprisings a year and a half after the Iranian Green Movement and shortly after the Tunisian revolution, Twitter and Facebook were blocked almost immediately after the first demonstrations, and the whole Internet was eventually shutdown for almost a week.
Still, the Egyptian shutdown wasn't the only one nor the longest; before that there was another case in China. After ethnic riots in July 2009 in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the Internet was shut down for 10 months, and, needless to say, webmasters and bloggers were imprisoned.
However, shutting down all Internet access has negative outcomes for the regime performing it and for the country's economy. That's why such an approach is seldom used. It's much more common to degrade the service -for instance, limiting uploading videos or streaming platforms for broadcasting -or to block particular platforms such as social networking sites.
Under Pressure
At this point, it must be noted that all of these authoritarian behaviors toward the Internet and social media require the collaboration of private companies, many of them headquartered in democratic countries. This collaboration always takes place on the grounds of legality -that is, the laws from the authoritarian regimeand, hence, companies claim they're forced to comply. That, however, is false: foreign companies could choose not to enter a given market and those who do it are choosing profit over principles.
To their credit, the most popular social media platforms such as Facebook or Twitter are blocked in China and Iran, so we can assume they haven't yielded to those governments' demands. Still, they aren't free of governmental pressures and blocks, even in nonauthoritarian countries.
Indeed, the most worrisome aspect of social media platforms isn't the behavior of their owners when confronted with authoritarian governments, but when facing demands from presumed democratic governments. This is crucial, because whether we like it or not, most liberal democracies are slowly drifting to a flawed status in a post-democracy scenario. 3 Under such a scenario, social media in particular and virtual realms in general will be much more strongly controlled -mainly based on the claim of fighting terrorism. At the same time, these platforms will play an increasingly important role during election campaigns.
Flawed and Post-Democratic Scenarios
Hence, before proceeding any further I must briefly discuss the features of flawed and post-democratic scenarios, even at the risk of simplifying them a bit. In both cases, elections are free and fair and thus governments are changed by the people; still, political culture and participation are poor. According to the postdemocracy theory, such a situation exists mainly because people have little voice in actual politics, which are slanted to the advantage of elites and corporations. Most participation focuses on elections, which have become a controlled spectacle aimed at persuading people to vote for one or another candidate on the basis of issues that lobbyists or special interest groups (most of them powered by corporations) have carefully selected. Another feature of this scenario is the rise of nonmainstream parties and movements, which at some points use unconventional, even contentious, approaches to political participation and rely heavily on social media.
Under such circumstances, social media owners are confronted with two main dilemmas: First, most of the time their platforms provide a realm for political participation, going from the conventional to the extreme, and are thus used to spread political material that sometimes will be contentious -including some that could be considered extremist or even terrorist. Second, during electoral campaigns, social media is used as a "weapon of mass persuasion" 4 where politicians attempt to "seem authentic" but can become victims of as well as instigate smear campaigns.
In both cases social media, and thus its owners, will be deemed responsible for allowing the spread of extremist or terrorist material; spreading biased views, even fake news; polarizing people and isolating them in echo chambers; and powering social bots that un fairly tilt electoral outcomes. Because these platform owners are deemed responsible, they will be pressured to take some kind of action by both the population and the authorities.
When faced with the spread of extremist or terrorist material, social media companies might be forced to identify some users, filter content, or block accounts. However, depending on the definition of terrorism, such measures could be considered as attacks on free speech but implemented under the guise of national security. 5, 6 If you think that such menaces just occur in Russia or Turkey -each of them a flawed democracy on the brink of authoritarianism -you should think twice, because they're being implemented or are under consideration in presumed liberal countries.
For instance, South Korea passed a real name verification law in 2007, which was enforced for five years before being declared unconstitutional; such a law was actually encouraging self-censorship. The UK has proposed banning individuals from broadcasting content, including social media, on the basis of the socalled Extremist Disruption Orders. In France, using social media is an aggravating circumstance when facing charges of terrorism, and the mere action of consulting online information labeled as terrorist is a terrorist act; moreover, authorities www.computer.org/internet/ IEEE INTERNET COMPUTING might ask providers to block access to sites hosting such content. In my own country -Spain -the criminal code was modified in such a way that any pressure on public authorities, including through social media, can be considered a form of terrorism. Indeed, the simple action of "making a statement on social media that could be 'perceived' as inciting others to commit violent attacks will be outlawed, even if the statement cannot be directly linked to an act of violence."
7 Actually, at the moment of this writing a 21-year-old Spanish woman has received a one-year suspended jail sentence for being accused of glorifying terrorism due to two jokes made on Twitter. 8 Thus, we find in presumed democratic countries laws and measures that discourage users from expressing unconventional and contentious political ideas for fear of being accused of extremism or terrorism, but allow authorities to block sites or content. At the same time that contentious ideas are increasingly risky for users to post on social media, the role that social media plays during electoral campaigns is becoming more prominent.
Purportedly, social media can help candidates spread their message, organize their campaign, raise funds, boost grassroots support, persuade undecided voters, get feedback from the electorate, engage with citizens in fruitful discussion, and get a minor but still valuable boost in votes.
The truth is that social media is used by candidates mainly as a broadcasting platform when spreading their message, often with the goal of setting the mass media agenda; feedback is seldom if ever incorporated into their manifests; and discussions with common citizens are rare and carefully orchestrated. Still, this isn't a problem per se but just a symptom of post-democracy, where electoral campaigns are a spectacle that most citizens watch in a passive attitude.
However, not every citizen is passive when facing electoral campaigns, and some of these people use social media as a megaphone to vocalize their positions. The problem is that those who are more vocal and active tend to represent the most extreme within each party, and that's a big problem. It's problematic because moderate voices prefer to remain silent or are silenced by those dominating the conversation. That, in turn, means that those solely following the posts but not posting themselves tend to believe that the majority position is the most extreme and vocal.
Because of this, we have a highly polarized population that's ripe for misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda. During the past five years many researchers have raised their voices to warn us about this worrisome situation, 9,10 but social media owners have done little. Research about the spreading of disinformation was targeted as a smear campaign itself. 11 However, after the 2016 presidential election in the US and the purported role played by the spreading of so-called fake news, this research is grabbing much more attention.
Social media companies claim that they're going to fight against fake news. However, there's a problem with this: while fact-checking a piece of fake news is possible, albeit not simple, for humans, it's a daunting task for machines. Certainly a machine-learning approach is feasible, but then the eventual system would not be fact-checking news but simply exercising the opinion bias of those who trained the system. In that case, the question is who ' Indeed, the crux of the matter is that any technology deployed to filter and remove content can, and likely would, be applied to content different from that originally intended. Therefore, the requests to filter hate speech, extremism, terrorism, and fake news arising in liberal democracies might very well be used against legitimate users and organizations expressing views differing from those of the supporters of the status quo.
S
ocial media might be a powerful tool, but it can be used in many adversarial ways: chasing dissenters, spreading disinformation, and eventually silencing those with a point of view different from the dominating (not majority) opinion. Moreover, asking private owners of social media to detect and filter problematic content is not only difficult but might very well backfire against free speech. On top of that, the current climate in liberal democracies isn't the best for implementing such technologies, given both the passivity of most citizens and the eagerness of authorities to fight extremist positions. I can't offer a solution, but what I'm sure about is that social media won't free us.
